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IN THE SUPREME CUURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT, 
vs 
RICHARD LYNN CARLSON, 
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
CASE NO. 16585 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, in 
vi o 1 at i on of U . C . A. 5 8 -3 7 -8 ( 1 ) ( a ) ( i i ) (Te t rah yd r a can nab i no 1 ) • 
DI SPOS IT ION IN THE LOWER CUURT 
The Honorable Peter F. Leary, sitting without a jury, found 
Appellant guilty of two counts of possession of a controlled 
substance with intent to distribute for value. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks reversal of the convictions. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about August 31, 1978, a team composed of University 
of Utah police officers, and officers from Salt Lake City and 
Salt Lake County, executed a search warrant at 5134 Jolley 
Street, in Salt Lake County, Utah. There they found the 
Appellant, Richard Lynn Carlson, and his wife, Margaret Carlson. 
The search yielded various items from the house, including 
two pistols (State's Exhibits 2 and 3), five bags, containing 
marijuana (State's exhibit 18), and an aerosal can with a false 
bottom, containing six (6) bags of a substance later determined 
to be heroin (State's Exhibit 6). Also received were two copies 
of the evidence list made at the scene (Defendant's Exhibits 19 
and 26). 
The case was tried without a jury before the Honorable Peter 
F. Leary. All witnesses were sworn, and the exclusionary rule 
was invoked as to the witnesses (T. 5, 6). As the police 
officers began testifying, it became apparent that there were 
problems in the establistunent of the chain of evidence of certain 
it s found in the home. 
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After the noon recsss, onthe first day of trial, counsel for 
the Appellant brought to the Court's attention the fact that 
counsel for the State, Jerry Campbell, was overheard discussing 
the case with several officers. The Appellant was sworn and 
testified that he overheard counsel for the State remark to the 
witnesses, "We've got to establish a chain!" 
When one of the Witnesses asked, "How do we do that?", !\Ir. 
Campbell was said to have replied, "Just do it!" {T. 85) Jerry 
Campbell was sworn and admitted that he had a conversation with 
several of the officers together {T. 90). The chain problem was 
discussed (T. 90.) Based upon this testimony, defense counsel 
made a motion to limit any further testimony from the officers 
involved. The Court admitted the evidence subject to a motion to 
strike at a later time, noting that the facts showed a clear 
violation of the Exclusionary Rule {T. 91.). 
The remainder of the trial consisted of admitting some of 
the items seized in the search of the home for the State's 
evidence. Deputy Michael George testified that, in his opinion, 
the amount of narcotics found would indicate they were held for 
sale rather than for personal use {T. 37, Vol 2.). 
At the end of the State's case, defense counsel made a 
motion to dismiss as to Margaret Carlson which motion was taken 
under advisement by the Court. 
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Margaret Carlson testified that she knew of no narcotics in 
the house except for a small amount of marijuana which her 
husband kept for his personal use (T. 99, Vol. 2) 
Bill Jenkins was called and after being admonished about his 
right against self-incrimination, as provided by the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution (T. 129-135, 160), 
testified that he was a user of heroin and that he had left an 
aerosol can, containing heroin, in Appellant's residence 
approximately one (l)hour before the search warrant (T 163, Vol. 
2) was executed .. He testified further that no one knew of the 
contents of the container (T. 164, Vol. 2). 
John Peterson and Lynn Williams were called, and testified 
to being former heroin addicts familiar with drug use. They 
testified to the fact that the amount of narcotics found in the 
Carlson home would not be an unusual amount for personal use. 
The defense rested, and the Court granted defense counsel's 
motion to dismiss, as to Margaret Carlson. Defense counsel 
renewed his motion to strike the testimony with respect to the 
"chain testimony", based upon the violation of the Exclusionary 
Rule. The Court took the matter under advisement, and later 
denied the motion. Appellant was found guilty of two counts of 
possession of a controlled substance, with intent to distribute 
for value, from which verdict he now appeals. 
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THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION 
TO STRIKE TESTII\10NY WHICH 
WAS TAINTED BY A CLEAR VIOLATION 
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE. 
In the case before the Court, the Appellant was convicted of 
two counts of possession of a controlled substance with intent to 
distribute for value, in violation of U.C.A. 58-37-S(l)(a)(ii), 
1953, as amended. Amounts of marijuana and heroin were found at 
Appellant's residence pursuant to a search warrant. 
At the beginning of the trial, which was conducted without a 
jury, counsel for Appellant moved that the Exclusionary Rule, as 
to witnesses, be invoked, which motion was granted (T. 5, 6). 
All potential witnesses for the state were sworn and properly 
admonished. l\luch of the trial consisted of the introduction of 
evidence consisting of items taken from Appellant's residence 
pursuant to the search warrant. During the first morning of 
trial, it became apparent that there were certain problems with 
the chain of custody of some critical items of evidence. Defense 
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counsel made numerous objections on that basis, which were 
sustained by the trial judge. (T. 53, 63). 
After the noon recess, defense counsel called the qppellant 
to the stand to testify as to a conversation he overheard between 
the prosecutor and the police officers. (T. 84-86) Counsel for 
the State, Jerry Campbell, was sworn and admitted to a 
conversation between himself and the officers who served as 
evidence custodians in the search. He also admitted that the 
chain of evidence problem was discussed. (T. 90). Defense 
counsel moved to limit further testimony by the officers involved 
(T. 91). The Court permitted the evidence to continue, subject 
to a motion to strike, which motion was later made and denied. 
The Court ruled that the Exclusionary Rule had been 
violated. Judge Leary stated: 
ttBut as I recall, the ordinary circumstances would 
be that you certainly might discuss individually 
with the witnesses what their testimony might be, or 
any matter in connection with .... but when you have 
two of them together, it certainly is a violation of 
the Rule in regard to exclusion of witnesses, and 
that's clear.tt (T. 91, 92). 
When the Exclusionary Rule is blatantly and clearly 
violated, as it was in this case, the law is clear. In State v. 
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~ 564, P. 2d, 312 (Utah 1977), this Court encountered a 
similar situation. The prosecutor discussed the case with 
several witnesses in a group. When the violation was brought to 
the Court's attention, defense counsel made a motion for a 
mistrial. The motion was denied, and this Court affirmed that 
decision (See, State v. Dodge, supra, at 313). The basis of the 
Court's ruling in Dodge was that 1) a less drastic corrective 
measure was available to counsel; and 2) no prejudice to 
Appellant was shown. The Court stated: 
"The trial court had other alternatives to the 
mistrial the Appellant requested. A motion to strike 
or exclude the violating witnesses' testimony could 
have been made. State v. Dodge, ~at 313. 
Counsel for Appellant availed himself of these options as 
suggested by this Court. The motions were denied. Continued 
testimony as to the chain was heard and allowed to stand. And, 
not surprisingly, the disputed items of evidence were later 
linked up in the chain and admitted (See the List of Exhibits 
contained in the record herein.) 
That the Exclusionary Rule was violated is undisputed, and 
the lower c0urt so ruled (T. 91). Counsel for defense made the 
proper motions, as suggested by this Court. That appellant was 
prejudiced is also clear from the fact that the chain problems 
evidenced in the morning session were later "cured". 
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As to the issue of prejudice, Appellant draws the Court's 
attention to what was said by Justice Maughn in dissenting in the 
Dodge case: 
"Where a discussion of the evidence to be put before 
the Court constitutes a violation of the rule, 
intrinsic to that violation is prejudice." State v. 
Dodge, supra, at 313 Emphasis Added. 
The prejudice is all the more serious where the evidence 
against the accused is wholly circumstantial. In the case before 
the Court, the only evidence was that controlled substances were 
found on the premises. No evidence linked appellant to the 
evidence or showed that he exercised dominion or control over the 
items. Again, quoting Justice Maughn: 
"Here it would appear the evidence which was used to 
convict was tainted by violation of the rule. In 
addition, there was no direct evidence - it was all 
circumstantial. In this kind of situation, I would 
conclude the matter should be reversed and remanded 
for a new trial. State v. Dodge, supra, at 314. 
Lest the Exclusionary Rule be rendered a nullity, with no 
method of enforcement, this Court should hold that the lower 
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court erred in not striking the testimony tainted by violation of 
the Rule, and reverse the conviction. 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE LOWER COURT 
WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTIONS 
It is axiomatic that, in a criminal prosecution, the State 
must prove each and every element beyond a reaonsable doubt. The 
information charged Appellant wih two counts of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute for value, U.C.A. 
58-37-B(l)(a (ii), 1953, as amended. It was therefore incumbent 
upon the State to prove: 1) that the Appellant possessed a 
substance; 2) that the substance was a controlled substance as 
defined by statute and 3) that he had the intent to distribute it 
for value. 
There is no dispute that controlled substances were found on 
the premises. However, that was all that the State proved. The 
only evidence was that some marijuana and heroin were found at 
the residence (State's Exhibits, 18P and 6P, respectively.) The 
residence was occupied jointly by the Appellant, his wife, and 
five children. Most of the evidence seized was in the northwest 
bedroom, where Appellant and his wife slept. There is no 
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evidence in the record which would tend to show that appellant 
"possessed" the substances. 
Possession has been defined as "having control over a place 
or thing with knowledge of and intent to have such control". 
State v. Faulkner. 220 Kan. 153, 551 P. 2d 1247 (1976). Jn 
other words to prove possession, the State must prove that a 
person exercises dominion or control over an item. That proof is 
totally lacking here. 
Mere presence of an accused at a place where a narcotic 
drug is found is insufficient to show knowledge of the drug's 
pre sen c e ( S tat e v . Mos 1 e y , 1 1 9 Ar i z . 3 9 3 , 5 8 1 P . 2 d 2 3 8 (1 9 7 8 ) ; 
Sullateskee v. State, 428 P. 2d, 736, (Okla., 1967). It should 
be noted that the Appellant's wife, another occupant in the home, 
was also charged in this case with the same crime. A motion to 
dismiss as to the charges against her was granted by the Court 
(T. 218, Vol. 2). Yet there appears no evidence to show that 
apoellant should be treated any differently on the issue of 
dominion of control than his wife. In fact, as regards the 
he r o i n , B i 1 1 Jen k i n s was ca 1 1 e d , and t es t i f i e d t ha t he , B i 11 
Jenkins, had left the hereoin there at the Carlson residence one 
hour before the search, without appellant's knowledge. This 
testimony came even after Mr. Jenkins had been informed of the 
fact that he may have been incriminating himself (T. 160-161) as to 
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a felony. 
The record does not disclose any evidence relating 
to appellant's possession. The only evidence unfavorable to 
appellant consists of the circumstantial evidence, the presence 
of narcotics in the home. Where evidence is wholly circumstantial, 
and facts and circumstances in evidence are of such a character 
as to fairly permit inference consistent with innocence, it 
cannot be regarded as evidence sufficient to support conviction. 
Jackson v. State, 403 P. 2d 518, (Okla. 1965). 
This court has held that where the only evidence 
pointing to guilt is circumstantial: 
.in order to warrant a conviction 
the evidence must exclude every reason-
able hypothesis other than the defendant's 
guilt." State v. John, 586 P. 2d 410,411 
(Utah 1978), and cases cited therein, at 
Note 2. 
As to the evidence with respect to possession of 
heroin by the appellant, the test espoused in John is not 
met. The testimony of Mr. Jenkins, given voluntarily, despite 
the possibility of his being prosecuted for a felony, raised 
a reasonable and undisputed hypothesis pointing to appellant's 
innocence. It should also be noted that Mr. Jenkins came 
forward with this information both to appellant and appellant's 
counsel, as soon as he learned of appellant's arrest (See 
defendant's exhibits 31D and 32D). The instant case being 
wholly circumstantial, the evidence is insufficient to support 
the convictions and this Court should reverse the convictions. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, appellant was convicted on 
the basis of circumstantial evidence. Critical items of 
evidence were introduced at trial, over objection after the 
exclusionary rule was clearly violated. The conference between 
Mr. Campbell and the officer-witnesses concerned the chain of 
custody problems, which were vigorously disputed by defense 
counsel. Later the items were linked up and admitted, thereby 
prejudicing the appellant. 
The State did not prove possession, a necessary elemen· 
I 
for the er ime charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. No evidence I 
was offered to show appellant's dominion or control over the 
itmes of contraband. There is insufficient evidence to support 
the convictions. For these reasons the Court should reverse 
convictions. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MARK A. BESENDORFER 
Lawyer for Appellant 
D. GILBERT ATHAY 
Lawyer for Appellant 
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